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LAWYER, CLIENT, COMMUNITY: TO 
WHOM DOES THE EDUCATION REFORM 
LAWSUIT BELONG? 
Amy M. Reichbach*
Abstract: Important education reform litigation is often undertaken by 
lawyers with admirable intentions. It is too easy, however, particularly in 
the context of large, enduring, complex litigation where it is difªcult to 
identify the class, much less name and pursue the class’s goals, to lose 
sight of the client-lawyer relationship and the signiªcance of client 
autonomy. Several recent lawsuits concerning the enforceability of No 
Child Left Behind exemplify issues that arise in class representation. In 
devising legal strategies, lawyers must balance the need to address cli-
ents’ immediate problems with the pursuit of longer-term strategies for 
change, such as organization and mobilization. It is difªcult work, but 
only through careful attention to relationships with and among clients 
and communities will lawyers participate effectively in achieving mean-
ingful education reform. 
Introduction: Deªning the Issues 
By deªnition, the public interest law ªrm begins with a concept of the pub-
lic interest and fashions its clients around that. This reverses the tradi-
tional process where attorneys begin with clients and then fashion a concept 
of the public interest to correspond to the interests of their clients. 
—Kenney Hegland1
 Important education reform litigation is often undertaken by 
lawyers with admirable intentions.2 It is too easy, however, particularly 
                                                                                                                      
* Law clerk to Judge Reginald C. Lindsay, U.S. District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts. B.A., Brown University, 1995; M.S.Ed., University of Pennsylvania, 1996; J.D., Bos-
ton College Law School, 2005. I wish to thank Phyllis Goldfarb and Paul Tremblay for their 
helpful comments on earlier drafts. 
1 Kenney Hegland, Beyond Enthusiasm and Commitment, 13 Ariz. L. Rev. 805, 811 
(1971). 
2 See generally, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (challenge to school seg-
regation); Hancock v. Comm’r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134 (Mass. 2005) (challenge to ade-
quacy of education provided in Massachusetts public schools); Campaign for Fiscal Equity 
v. State, 814 N.Y.S.2d 1 (App. Div. 2006) (challenge to adequacy of funding of New York 
public schools). 
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in the context of large, enduring, complex litigation where it is 
difªcult to identify the class, much less name and pursue its goals, to 
lose sight of the client-lawyer relationship and the signiªcance of cli-
ent autonomy.3 In devising legal strategies, lawyers must balance the 
need to address clients’ immediate problems with the pursuit of 
longer-term strategies for change, such as organization and mobiliza-
tion.4 Representing a class is further complicated by the fact that 
plaintiffs are frequently disempowered by the very system they are 
challenging, by race and class differences between lawyers and their 
clients, and by the limited preparation lawyers receive for working 
effectively with communities.5 The disconnect between public interest 
lawyers and their clients in education and other structural reform liti-
gation is further exacerbated by time constraints, making meaningful 
client-lawyer communication difªcult, and by potentially divergent 
interests among a group of clients and between the lawyer and the 
client.6 Lawsuits concerning the enforceability of the No Child Left 
Behind Act (NCLB)7 exemplify many of these issues. 
 This article begins in Part I with a brief description of several re-
cent lawsuits involving NCLB. Part II highlights concerns that arise in 
the context of lawyering for social justice, particularly through com-
plex litigation, and examines the manifestation of these issues in the 
lawsuits described above. Part III discusses strategies courts and law-
yers may employ to alleviate these concerns, and the article concludes 
by applying these recommendations in the context of education re-
form. 
                                                                                                                      
3 See Mary Kay Kane, Of Carrots and Sticks: Evaluating the Role of the Class Action Lawyer, 
66 Tex. L. Rev. 385, 389 (1987) (asserting that class actions are unique because of the 
degree of management required and the inherent problems of client control and conºicts 
of interest). 
4 See Paul R. Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, Regnant Lawyering, and Street-Level Bureauc-
racy, 43 Hastings L.J. 947, 956 (1992). 
5 See Edgar S. Cahn & Jean Camper Cahn, Power to the People or the Profession?—The Pub-
lic Interest in Public Interest Law, 79 Yale L.J. 1005, 1024 (1970). 
6 See Kane, supra note 3, at 386. 
7 Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (to be codiªed as amended primarily in 
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
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I. Lawsuits Concerning the Enforceability of NCLB 
It was all white people on this side [of the courtroom], and all white people 
on [that] side—and the argument is about our children. 
—Connecticut NAACP President Scot X. Esdaile8
 Lawsuits addressing inequities in school funding have enjoyed 
only limited success in terms of impact on the quality of education 
that children attending high-poverty schools receive.9 As a result, edu-
cation reformers have examined other rights that may be enforceable 
in courts, including those provided in NCLB.10 At the same time, one 
State and a group of school districts from several states, joined by a 
national teachers’ union and a number of its local afªliates, have sepa-
rately challenged NCLB in court as an unenforceable unfunded man-
date.11 A brief recounting of some of these lawsuits, and their 
conºicts with each other, will provide context for the remainder of 
                                                                                                                      
8 Robert A. Frahm, NAACP Details Opposition to “No Child” Lawsuit, Hartford Cou-
rant, Mar. 23, 2006, at B1 (describing Esdaile’s comment to a mostly black audience about 
why the State NAACP opposes a lawsuit ªled by the Connecticut Attorney General chal-
lenging NCLB). 
9 See, e.g., Hancock v. Comm’r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134 (Mass. 2005) (holding that 
the Commonwealth had satisªed its constitutional duty with respect to public schools); 
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 814 N.Y.S.2d 1 (App. Div. 2006) (holding as violative of 
separation of powers an order directing the State to adopt certain measures to adequately 
fund schools). These inequities facing high-poverty schools have been documented in a 
number of publications. See generally Scott Joftus, Alliance for Excellent Educ., 
Every Child a Graduate: A Framework for an Excellent Education for All Mid-
dle and High School Students 1–2 (2002), available at http://www.all4ed.org/publica- 
tions/EveryChildAGraduate/every.pdf; Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of 
Educ., The Social Context of Education (1997), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs97/97981. 
pdf; Molly S. McUsic, The Law’s Role in the Distribution of Education: The Promises and Pitfalls of 
School Finance Litigation, in Law and School Reform: Six Strategies for Promoting 
Educational Equity 88 ( Jay P. Heubert ed., 1999). 
10 See, e.g., Nat’l Law Ctr. on Homelessness & Poverty, R.I. v. New York (NLC ), 224 
F.R.D. 314, 319 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (rights of homeless students); Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for 
Reform Now v. New York City Dep’t of Educ. (ACORN ), 269 F. Supp. 2d 338 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (students’ rights to transfer and supplemental educational services (SES) and par-
ents’ notiªcation right). A detailed discussion of the rights contained in NCLB, and theo-
ries developed to enforce those rights, is beyond the scope of this article, but interested 
readers may consult C. Joy Farmer, Note, The No Child Left Behind Act: Will It Produce a New 
Breed of School Financing Litigation?, 38 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 443 (2005); Sarah D. 
Greenberger, Comment, Enforceable Rights, No Child Left Behind, and Political Patriotism: A 
Case for Open-Minded Section 1983 Jurisprudence, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1011 (2005); Amy 
Reichbach, Note, The Power Behind the Promise: Enforcing No Child Left Behind to Improve Edu-
cation, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 667 (2004). 
11 See Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Spellings, No. Civ.A. 05-CV-71535-D, 2005 WL 3149545, at 
*1 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 23, 2005). 
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the discussion. These particular lawsuits are highlighted because, al-
though the lawyers involved in them were doing good work, in com-
bination they reveal some of the tensions faced by those who repre-
sent communities. Awareness of these tensions may further inform 
effective class action practice. 
A. Attempts to Enforce Various Provisions of NCLB 
 In 2003, in Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now v. 
New York City Department of Education (ACORN ), a group of parents 
and community associations ªled a lawsuit against the New York City 
Board of Education and the Albany School District and their respec-
tive Chancellor and Superintendent alleging, inter alia, that the de-
fendants had violated several provisions of NCLB.12 Speciªcally, the 
plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had failed to provide students 
attending schools in need of improvement, corrective action, or re-
structuring, with the rights to transfer to different schools and obtain 
supplemental educational services (SES).13 Also, the defendants al-
legedly had failed to inform parents of the schools’ inclusion in these 
categories and the corresponding right to request a transfer or SES.14 
A judge in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York held that the plaintiffs could not maintain their action pursuant 
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because NCLB “does not reºect the clear and 
unambiguous intent of Congress to create individually enforceable 
rights.”15
 The following year, in National Law Center on Homelessness and Pov-
erty, Rhode Island v. New York (NLC ), a judge in the U.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District of New York denied the State’s motion to dis-
miss a lawsuit alleging, inter alia, that the plaintiffs, parents of home-
less children residing in Suffolk County, New York, had been deprived 
of their rights secured by the McKinney-Vento Act, a pre-existing law 
                                                                                                                      
12 ACORN, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 339. The plaintiffs focused on the provisions of NCLB 
appearing at 20 U.S.C.A. § 6316 (b)(1)(E), (b)(5)(A), (b)(7)(C), and (b)(8)(A)(i) (trans-
fer provisions); § 6316 (b)(5)(B), (b)(7)(C)(iii), (b)(8)(A)(ii), and (e) (provisions gov-
erning SES); and § 6316(b)(6) (parental notiªcation). See id. at 339–46. Nearly two years 
later, relying on ACORN, a federal district court judge in Ohio similarly concluded that 
NCLB did not confer rights upon private providers of tutoring services to bring an action 
enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or by an implied private right of action. See Fresh Start 
Acad. v. Toledo Bd. of Educ., 363 F. Supp. 2d 910, 916 (N.D. Ohio 2005). 
13 ACORN, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 339. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 347. 
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reauthorized as part of NCLB in 2002.16 The judge also allowed the 
plaintiffs’ motion for class certiªcation.17 In concluding that the 
plaintiffs’ rights were enforceable under § 1983, the judge explained 
that Congress clearly intended that the McKinney-Vento Act confer 
individually enforceable rights.18 He distinguished McKinney-Vento 
from the provisions of NCLB that the judge in ACORN had deter-
mined did not confer such enforceable rights.19 In documents sub-
mitted to the court, the NLC plaintiffs’ counsel drew the same distinc-
tion, adopting the ACORN court’s analysis of NCLB and describing 
the earlier lawsuit as addressing an “entirely different statutory re-
gime.”20 In so doing, they strengthened some of their clients’ educa-
tional rights (those secured speciªcally for homeless children by the 
McKinney-Vento Act), while adopting arguments that weakened any 
claim their clients might make in the future to other rights held by 
homeless and non-homeless children alike, speciªcally rights to the 
parental notice, SES, and transfer provisions of NCLB. 
B. Challenges to NCLB 
 Although children and their parents have not challenged NCLB as 
a class, other plaintiffs have done so.21 Their actions have colored the 
landscape for those seeking to pursue education reform through the 
courts. School districts in several states, joined by a national teachers’ 
union and ten of its local afªliates, ªled a thus far unsuccessful lawsuit 
against the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Education in her 
                                                                                                                      
16 224 F.R.D. 314, 314, 318, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). The purpose of the McKinney-Vento 
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11431–11435, is to “ensure that each child of a homeless individual and 
each homeless youth has equal access to the same free, appropriate public education . . . as 
provided to other children and youths.” 42 U.S.C. § 11431 (2002); see NLC, 224 F.R.D. at 
318. 
17 NLC, 224 F.R.D. at 326. 
18 Id. at 319–20. 
19 Id. at 320–21. The judge speciªcally noted several distinctions between McKinney-
Vento and NCLB. Id. NCLB seeks aggregate education reform by holding states and edu-
cational agencies (LEAs) accountable, focuses on whether LEAs are making adequate 
yearly progress, and provides for federal enforcement. Id. McKinney-Vento, in contrast, 
imposes on the State a mandatory requirement to provide for each homeless child the 
“same opportunity and access to education as a nonhomeless child,” provides for speciªc 
entitlements for speciªc individuals “by directing [LEAs] to carry out speciªc activities,” 
and lacks any mechanism for administrative enforcement. Id. at 320. 
20 See Plaintiff’s Opposition to State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, NLC, 224 F.R.D. 
314 (E.D.N.Y. 2004), ªled July 8, 2004, at 19–20 (on ªle with author). 
21 See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Spellings, No. Civ.A. 05-CV-71535-D, 2005 WL 
3149545 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 23, 2005), appeal docketed, No. 05-2708 (6th Cir. Mar. 22, 2006); 
Connecticut v. Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d 459 (D. Conn. 2006). 
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ofªcial capacity, alleging that NCLB is an unenforceable, unfunded 
mandate.22 The Attorney General of Connecticut, claiming to be 
ªghting in the public interest to close the achievement gap, obtain 
adequate federal funding for all classrooms, and “vindicate the rights of 
our children,”23 ªled a separate lawsuit on similar grounds.24 Highlight-
ing conºicts among those who claim to speak for children attending 
persistently failing schools, the NAACP in Connecticut, accompanied 
by several minority schoolchildren, ªled a motion to intervene in the 
Connecticut case on the side of the defendant federal government.25 
The NAACP and other opponents of Connecticut’s action fear that the 
Attorney General’s lawsuit could set dangerous precedent for other 
civil rights laws, hurt minority and poor children by allowing a state to 
                                                                                                                      
22 See generally Spellings (Pontiac), 2005 WL 3149545 (ªled by several school districts in 
Michigan, Texas and Vermont; the National Education Association (NEA); and NEA-afªliates 
in Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, 
Utah and Vermont). The lawsuit was dismissed, but that dismissal was appealed to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. A group of six States and the District of Columbia 
ªled an amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs’ appeal, as did the Governor of Pennsylvania 
and several state and local elected ofªcials. See Amici Curiae Brief of the States of Connecti-
cut, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Oklahoma, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia, Sch. Dist. 
of Pontiac v. Spellings, No. 05–278 (6th Cir. 2006), ªled March 31, 2006, available at 
http://www.nea.org/lawsuit/images/connamicus.pdf; NEA, Stand Up for Children: Pontiac 
v. Spellings, http://www.nea.org/lawsuit/index.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2006). 
23 Press Release, Conn. Attorney Gen.’s Ofªce, Attorney General Files Amended NCLB 
Lawsuit; Says Federal Education Funding Inadequate Even with Cheaper Testing Model (Feb. 
28, 2006), available at http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?A=2426&Q=310496; Press Re-
lease, Conn. Attorney Gen.’s Ofªce, Attorney General’s Statement on NACCP Petition to 
Support Federal Motion to Dismiss NCLB Suit ( Jan. 30, 2006), available at http://www. 
ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?A=2426&Q=309542 [hereinafter Press Release, Statement on 
Petition]. 
24 See Plaintiff’s Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Connecticut v. Spell-
ings, No. 3:05-CV-01330 (D. Conn. Aug. 22, 2005), available at http://www.lawyerscomm.org/ 
2005website/projects/education/educationpics/nclb%20original%20complaint.pdf. Three 
of four counts were dismissed recently on jurisdictional grounds; the judge held that state 
ofªcials cannot maintain a pre-enforcement challenge to NCLB. Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d 
at 489, 491 (dismissing Count I); id. at 494 (dismissing Count II); id. at 501 (dismissing 
Count III); id. at 503 (granting in part and denying in part defendant’s motion to dismiss 
as to Count IV). 
25 Press Release, Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, State NAACP Seeks to 
Intervene in No Child Left Behind Suit ( Jan. 30, 2006), available at http://www.lawyers 
comm.org/2005website/publications/press/press13006.html [hereinafter Press Release, 
State NAACP]. The judge granted permission for the NAACP to ªle a response, but later 
denied the motion to intervene without prejudice to its renewal pending resolution of the 
issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 466–67. Having resolved 
these issues, the court recently invited interested non-parties to ªle motions to intervene. 
Id. at 503. 
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avoid its obligations to them under NCLB, and squander state re-
sources that could otherwise be used to improve schools.26
II. Tensions in Structural Reform Lawsuits 
Idealism, though perhaps rarer than greed, is harder to control. 
—Derrick A. Bell, Jr. 27
 Several tensions manifested in the lawsuits discussed above arise 
frequently in the context of lawyering for education and other struc-
tural reform, and can limit the efªcacy of both process and results. 
These tensions include the strength of lawyers’ ideological commit-
ments, attenuated relationships between class counsel and their cli-
ents, and the role of client autonomy in group representation. 
A. Lawyers’ Ideological Commitments 
 The Attorney General of Connecticut’s choice to challenge 
NCLB indicates that he views such an action as consistent with his ob-
ligation “to represent the interests of the people of the State of Con-
necticut in all civil legal matters involving the state to protect the pub-
lic interest.”28 The NLC plaintiffs’ attorneys aimed to secure 
education for homeless children.29 Yet both of their approaches have 
potentially negative ramiªcations for the very populations they seek to 
protect.30
 This is not an unusual situation, though it is not an unproblem-
atic one.31 Legal actions based on attorneys’ ideological commitments 
                                                                                                                      
 
26 See Press Release, State NAACP, supra note 25; see also Robert A. Frahm, NAACP Op-
poses State Lawsuit: Attacking Federal No Child Left Behind Act Could Harm Minorities, Group 
Says, Hartford Courant, Jan. 21, 2006, at A1. 
27 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School 
Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale L.J. 470, 504 (1976). 
28 See Conn. Attorney Gen.’s Ofªce, About Us, http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/browse. 
asp?a=2175 (last visited Oct. 25, 2006). 
29 See supra text accompanying notes 16–20. 
30 Although this paper criticizes lawsuits for structural reform that appear to neglect 
meaningful client and community input or compromise class members’ rights without 
their informed consent, the author in no way means to suggest that it is easy or convenient 
to engage clients and communities in crafting lawsuits and other responses to problems 
such as inadequate educational opportunity. As the circumstances of these cases reveal, 
there are signiªcant trade-offs involved. Had the lawyers in the NLC case not distinguished 
the McKinney-Vento Act from other provisions of NCLB, for example, they may well have 
lost their case. See NLC, 224 F.R.D. 314, 320–21 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). 
31 See Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 
Stan. L. Rev. 207, 231 (1976) (asserting that public interest practitioners, including estab-
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may be simply the manifestation of what lawyers think is important, 
rather than an expression of the concerns of clients, class, or com-
munity.32 Their concerns about the potentially broad impact of NCLB 
drove the actions of the Attorney General, school districts, teachers’ 
unions, the Connecticut NAACP, and the plaintiffs’ lawyers in NLC. 
This typiªes the focus of “cause lawyers” on the “broad stakes involved 
in representing their client community.”33 The Attorney General de-
cided to challenge NCLB in court because he believed children are 
“ultimately the victims of unkept federal promises and inadequate 
resources resulting from unfunded federal mandates.”34 He viewed 
the endorsement of the lawsuit by a large number of school boards 
across the state as a “groundswell of grassroots support—crossing all 
geographic, political and socio-economic borders.”35 Yet he ªled the 
lawsuit before ascertaining whether a large number of students and 
their parents, whose lives would be affected directly by the lawsuit, 
wished to pursue it.36 The moral implications of such decisions by law-
yers raise the “critical question of accountability in a democratic soci-
ety,” because in choosing which claims to bring, lawyers serve as gate-
keepers to the legal system.37
 Many education reform plaintiffs’ lawyers may believe they have 
adequate information upon which to base their strategic decision-
making, even without client input, because they have spent decades 
                                                                                                                      
lished law reform organizations, have been historically “selective in deªning litigation pri-
orities within a broad range of . . . grievances”). 
32 See William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group Mem-
bers and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 Yale L.J. 1623, 1637–38 (1997) (discussing 
the fact that while lawyers were debating about when to bring forward a case to press the 
issue of gay marriage, lesbians and gay men started ªling their own legal actions without 
support from legal experts). 
33 See John O. Calmore, A Call to Context: The Professional Challenges of Cause Lawyering at 
the Intersection of Race, Space, and Poverty, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 1927, 1932 (1999). 
34 See Press Release, Statement on Petition, supra note 23. 
35 Press Release, Conn. Attorney Gen.’s Ofªce, Attorney General, Superintendents 
Announce 109 School Board Endorsements of NCLB Suit ( Jan. 17, 2006), http://www.ct. 
gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?A=2426&Q=308722. 
36 See Frahm, supra note 8. The NAACP’s intervention on behalf of minority plaintiff 
children reveals the lack of uniªed community support. See id. (“The NAACP’s decision to 
back [NCLB] is an effort to guarantee that poor and minority children are represented in 
the courtroom argument over how it will be applied in Connecticut.”). 
37 Cahn & Cahn, supra note 5, at 1008 (asserting that because a group of independent 
lawyers remains “free to choose [its] own version of the public interest . . . [w]hether pub-
lic interest law will develop new methods of ensuring democratic control of the nation’s 
resources and programs or whether it will be a further entrenchment of the most elitist 
tendencies in the law remains to be seen”). 
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pursuing educational equity.38 The disparity in expertise possessed by 
lawyers and their clients, however, raises additional concerns, as it may 
increase client dependence and permit lawyers to manipulate clients 
in the guise of providing assistance.39 In addition, many idealistic law-
yers may choose the class action as a litigation strategy because it ad-
vances broad idealistic goals and affects large numbers of people 
while potentially providing the self-reinforcement of winning a big 
case.40 Given the level of their investment, it may be difªcult for law-
yers to step back from their own strategies to consult with clients who 
may disagree with them.41 This problem is exacerbated by a lack of 
clarity as to the precise identity of the client. The Connecticut Attor-
ney General, for example, represents the state and the “public,” enti-
ties difªcult to deªne. Although they represent speciªc clients, the 
Connecticut NAACP and the NLC plaintiffs’ attorneys, like many pub-
lic interest lawyers, may “see themselves as advocates for a much more 
loosely deªned constituency or community.”42 Furthermore, many 
education reform lawsuits are ªled on behalf of young people under 
the age of eighteen, which raises a plethora of additional issues, de-
tailed discussion of which is beyond the scope of this article.43
                                                                                                                      
 
38 See Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenªeld, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 
8 U. Chi. L. Rev. 684, 714 (1941) (observing that the individuals making up a group in a 
class action are usually in no position to act for themselves because they lack knowledge 
and because the expense of seeking redress is much greater than their individual stake in a 
controversy); see also Bell, supra note 27, at 491 & n.63 (noting that the willingness of many 
attorneys to assume that they know best may lead to a lack of accountability to clients). In 
Serving Two Masters, Professor Derrick Bell discusses the consequences of the NAACP’s 
pursuit of integration as the only acceptable remedy for the poor quality of education that 
black students were receiving. See Bell, supra note 27, at 476 & n.21. Many of Bell’s critiques 
of the NAACP’s legal strategy in school desegregation cases, written thirty years ago, apply 
with equal force to lawsuits concerning the enforceability of NCLB today. 
39 Cahn & Cahn, supra note 5, at 1040 (“We have seen this take place in the legal ser-
vice programs—where lawyers ‘for’ the poor decide what in their professional collective 
wisdom is in the best interests of the poor.”). 
40 Bell, supra note 27, at 493. 
41 See id. (asserting that psychological motivations may underlie lawyers’ tendency to 
direct a class action lawsuit toward their own goals rather than those of their clients). 
42 See id. at 491 & n.63 (citing Comment, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 Yale L.J. 
1069, 1124–25 (1970)). 
43 In addition to the difªculties many public lawyers have in deªning their clients, the 
context of education further complicates the issue. Named plaintiffs may include students 
under the age of eighteen, though their parents hold many of their educational rights, 
such as those provided in the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act, and may be 
included as “next friends” or plaintiffs in their own right. See, e.g., NLC, 224 F.R.D. 314, 316 
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) (concerning action commenced by parents of homeless children); 
ACORN, 269 F. Supp. 2d 338, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (concerning claim initiated by parents of 
schoolchildren). Where students’ goals diverge from those of their parents, additional 
140 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 27:131 
B. Attenuated Relationships with Clients 
 It is difªcult in the context of complex litigation for lawyers to 
fulªll their ethical obligations to consult with clients regularly and 
fully inform them of relevant considerations.44 Typically, parties in a 
class action exercise little control over their lawyers; the usual em-
ployer-employee relationship is absent, as class action lawyers must 
represent the interests of an amorphous group of clients.45 The dis-
tance between class action lawyers and their clients may lead lawyers 
to underestimate their clients’ stake in the matter or to fail to recog-
nize potential conºicts that require their attention.46
 Members of the plaintiff classes in ACORN and NLC and the 
intervener class in Connecticut are numerous and potentially divided, 
making it difªcult for lawyers to ªgure out whom to consult for guid-
ance in strategic decision-making.47 Even if class members are easily 
identiªable, should the class action lawyer’s obligation run to the rep-
resentative party, someone who is typically not chosen by class mem-
bers but either comes forward as a volunteer or is sought out by the 
lawyers, or to the class as a whole?48 Counsel may limit interaction 
                                                                                                                      
 
conºicts are raised for lawyers who represent children. A more detailed discussion of these 
issues, which raise important considerations for lawyers representing young people, is be-
yond the scope of this article. Interested readers may consult Kristin Henning, Loyalty, 
Paternalism and Rights: Client Counseling Theory and the Role of Child Counsel in Delinquency 
Cases, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 245, 266 (2005) and Martha Matthews, Ten Thousand Tiny 
Clients: The Ethical Duty of Representation in Children’s Class-Action Cases, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 
1435, 1439 (1996). 
44 Bell, supra note 27, at 504. 
45 Kane, supra note 3, at 389; see Bell, supra note 27, at 491 (noting that civil rights at-
torneys frequently are isolated from their clients). 
46 An example of such an underestimation is provided in Rabin’s assertion that “[t]he 
classical tension that the poverty or criminal lawyer sometimes confronts between estab-
lishing broad precedent and safeguarding the rights of his client is hardly ever an issue 
because public interest advocates simply do not have discrete clients whose personal liberty 
or property is at stake.” Rabin, supra note 31, at 234. 
47 See Bell, supra note 27, at 504 (discussing these concerns in the context of school de-
segregation litigation); see also supra note 43, and accompanying text (describing special 
issues that arise in representing underage clients). In NLC, for example, one of the plain-
tiffs was no longer homeless by the time the case reached resolution and, as a result, that 
plaintiff’s priorities may have shifted during the course of the litigation. See 224 F.R.D. at 
325. 
48 See Bell, supra note 27, at 511. Bell suggests, further, that lawyers’ obligations to their 
clients may be compromised because of how their work is funded or because some groups 
are more effective than others in getting their attention. See id. at 489 (noting that because 
established civil rights groups ªghting school segregation were funded by middle class 
blacks and whites who believed in integration, civil rights attorneys favored this strategy 
over others); id. at 491 (suggesting that civil rights attorneys may feel as though they must 
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with named plaintiffs because ªduciary obligations run to the class as 
a whole, such that named plaintiffs’ directives are not of controlling 
signiªcance.49 Yet this obligation to represent the interests of all 
members of a class frequently results in numerous potential conºicts 
between the interests of lawyers, named class representatives, and un-
named class members.50 Especially where such conºicts exist, it may 
be difªcult for a lawyer with “strong prudential or ideological prefer-
ences” herself to decide who should be heard.51
C. The Role of Client Autonomy 
 The difªculties discussed above may lead lawyers pursuing struc-
tural reform to underestimate the importance of ascertaining the in-
terests of their clients or community. Even if they are aware of clients’ 
concerns, lawyers may choose not to pursue narrower client interests 
that conºict with the larger cause as they perceive it.52 The strength of 
their passions and commitments may lead lawyers to prioritize their 
own ideologies or strategic concerns over individual autonomy, a prob-
lematic notion for an adjudicative system that holds that clients, not 
their lawyers, are responsible for deªning the objectives of litigation.53 
The issue of client autonomy is further complicated within class actions 
by the concept of group autonomy and the question whether it is more 
appropriate to emphasize individual autonomy, some form of group 
consensus, or more abstract notions of collective justice.54
1. Individual Autonomy as a Guiding Principle for Client-Lawyer 
Relationships 
 The foundation of client-centered lawyering is the premise that 
an individual should make her own legal decisions.55 The lawyer is an 
employee of the client whose professional duty is to advocate for her 
                                                                                                                      
answer only to those whom they consult in deªning the goals of the litigation; concerns of 
those who do not have access to the lawyers may go unaddressed). 
49 Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conºicts in Class Actions, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1183, 1203 & n.82 
(1982) (citing Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1211 (5th Cir. 1982)). 
50 Kane, supra note 3, at 394–95. 
51 Rhode, supra note 49, at 1212. 
52 See Calmore, supra note 33, at 1932–36. 
53 See Rhode, supra note 49, at 1183. 
54 See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 913, 916 (1998). 
55 See Stephen Ellman, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and Collective 
Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers’ Representation of Groups, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1103, 1128 
(1992). 
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employer’s best interest.56 It is the client, not the lawyer, who deter-
mines what is in the client’s best interest.57 This paradigm requires 
that lawyers gain their clients’ trust and cooperation in order to facili-
tate communication.58 By making an effort to understand their cli-
ents’ situations; engaging clients in identifying their own objectives, 
alternatives, and concerns; and offering empathy, client-centered law-
yers assist clients in making their own decisions and thereby protect 
individual autonomy.59
 It is unclear to what extent the lawyers involved in the lawsuits 
concerning the enforceability of NCLB have considered client auton-
omy. In ACORN, plaintiffs included parents of children attending 
schools in two very different districts.60 Had the litigation not been 
dismissed at such an early stage, some plaintiffs’ schools may have 
achieved sufªcient progress to be removed from the list of schools 
identiªed for school improvement, corrective action, or restructuring, 
such that those students would no longer be entitled, under NCLB, to 
receive SES or tutoring.61 At that point, their lawyers (or the court) 
may have considered separate representation or sub-classes for dis-
tinct factions of the plaintiff class.62 In NLC, at least one of the initial 
plaintiffs was no longer homeless at the time the class was certiªed.63 
A legal strategy that emphasized the rights of homeless students to the 
detriment of the rights of all students attending failing schools may 
no longer have been that plaintiff’s individual choice.64
                                                                                                                      
 
56 Cahn & Cahn, supra note 5, at 1041. 
57 Id. 
58 See Ellman, supra note 55, at 1128. An in-depth review of the principles of client-
centered lawyering is beyond the scope of this article, but for more information the reader 
may consult David A. Binder et al., Lawyers as Counselors: A Client-Centered Ap-
proach (2d ed. 2004). Prevailing client-centered models have, however, been critiqued for 
their failure to fully account for issues of race and class. See generally Michelle S. Jacobs, People 
from the Footnotes: The Missing Element in Client-Centered Counseling, 27 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 
345 (1997). 
59 See Ellman, supra note 55, at 1128–29. 
60 See ACORN, 269 F. Supp. 2d 338, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (recognizing that plaintiff chil-
dren attended schools in Albany and New York City). 
61 Cf. 20 U.S.C.A. § 6316(b)(5)(B), (b)(7)(C)(iii), (b)(8)(A)(ii), (e) (West 2003) (set-
ting forth provisions governing SES available to students attending schools failing to make 
adequate yearly progress). 
62 See infra notes 93–94, 97 and accompanying text. 
63 NLC, 224 F.R.D. 314, 325, 326 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). 
64 See supra notes 16–20 and accompanying text. Although it may have been sound le-
gal strategy, the NLC plaintiffs’ lawyers’ choices not to challenge the ACORN court’s de-
termination that many rights provided by NCLB are unenforceable and to distinguish, 
instead, those rights provided by the McKinney-Vento Act, would make it more difªcult for 
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2. Autonomy in the Context of Group Representation 
 The trust and cooperation that a lawyer must build with her cli-
ents becomes more difªcult in the context of community lawyering, 
which requires lawyers to take into account both individual autonomy 
and their clients’ choices to make connections.65 The group lawyer’s 
responsibility runs to the group and its interests, not solely to individ-
ual clients.66 Maintaining the autonomy of group clients requires that 
lawyers help group members to clarify their goals, identify and evalu-
ate their options, and ultimately choose a course of action.67 This 
model promotes group-based decision-making by placing responsibil-
ity for litigation decisions concerning a group in the hands of the 
group as a whole, rather than an individual within the group.68 Un-
fortunately, the group that convenes to participate in a democratic 
decision-making process may not actually reºect the interests and 
concerns of the group it purports to represent.69 Furthermore, where 
disagreements among group members manifest themselves, the law-
yer for that group must develop an understanding of the nature of 
any such conºicts, maintain her loyalty to the group as an entity, and 
refrain from abandoning her duties to all members.70 As she seeks 
                                                                                                                      
their clients, whether they remained homeless or not, to enforce their rights to, for exam-
ple, SES. 
65 See Ellman, supra note 55, at 1107 (indicating that lawyers representing communities 
must understand and respect community norms and monitor empathic responses, choices, 
and values). 
66 See Rubenstein, supra note 32, at 1679; see also Rhode, supra note 49, at 1203. 
67 See Ellman, supra note 55, at 1132; see also Rubenstein, supra note 32, at 1634 (assert-
ing that client-centered lawyering for groups requires the development of democratic 
means of group member involvement). 
68 Rubenstein, supra note 32, at 1655. Under this model, the decision to go to court 
belongs to the group collectively, and decisions regarding litigation require the input and 
assent of those whose rights are at issue. Id. This model increases litigation’s claim to le-
gitimacy and individuals’ conªdence in their community. Id. at 1655–56. As a result of 
democratic decision-making, the community becomes more involved with decisions that 
affect it, and community members become more actively engaged with each other, with 
the law, and with their “advocate-experts.” Id. at 1656. 
69 See id. at 1658; Rhode, supra note 49, at 1233–37 (observing that few class members 
attend meetings convened by attorneys in civil rights cases, and those who do respond or 
attend are often neither knowledgeable nor unbiased). 
70 See Ellman, supra note 55, at 1159–60. Ellman emphasizes that the lawyer’s ethical 
duty is to represent the position endorsed by the organization, rather than withdraw. Id. at 
1160. If disagreements persist, the group’s lawyer should ask those who dissent from the 
organization’s position whether they want to pursue the issue themselves and, if so, advise 
them to obtain separate counsel. Id. at 1161. 
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consensus within the group, the lawyer must prevent herself from tak-
ing over the process.71
 If the attorneys for the Connecticut NAACP and the plaintiffs’ 
lawyers in NLC view not individuals, but a group or groups as their 
client, it might be difªcult for them to ascertain the group’s autono-
mous wishes. For example, the Connecticut NAACP may view itself as 
representing the individual plaintiffs on whose behalf it intervened, 
all poor and minority children in Connecticut, or the broader civil 
rights community, groups whose interests may or may not overlap. 
Depending upon which group or groups the plaintiffs’ lawyers viewed 
as their client, the principles discussed above would drive a different 
process of nurturing and maintaining group autonomy. This feat be-
comes even more challenging in the absence of an established group 
that can be said to represent all students subject to both the require-
ments and the beneªts of NCLB.72 In the event that one or more 
groups claim to represent these students, tensions might emerge be-
tween the groups and communities across the nation. 
3. Autonomy in Class Actions 
 The Model Rules do not address adequately how to establish a 
community’s legal goals and determine the best ways to achieve 
them.73 Because an individualist model drives rules of civil procedure 
and professional ethics in the American adjudicative system, an indi-
vidual group member may claim to represent and bind those similarly 
situated, and her attorney may determine how the case will be pur-
sued.74 Because the class action lawyer owes a duty to the class, rather 
than to individuals, she must approach client autonomy with a par-
ticular sensitivity to her professional and ethical responsibilities.75 She 
                                                                                                                      
 
71 See id. at 1141, 1154; Rubenstein, supra note 32, at 1679. Ellman also emphasizes that 
the lawyer must be careful to remain balanced and avoid making promises of conªdential-
ity or seeming partial to some subset of the group. See Ellman, supra note 55, at 1137–38. 
He further cautions that although a lawyer can empower groups by facilitating access to 
court, she must be aware that the class is not empowered against the lawyer herself. Id. at 
1118. 
72 See Ellman, supra note 55, at 1119. 
73 Rubenstein, supra note 32, at 1676. 
74 Id. at 1624. 
75 See Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1211 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Ellman, supra 
note 55, at 1119 (noting that under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e), with court approval, lawyers may 
settle a case even where a majority of named class representatives object). As Ellman indi-
cates, the absence of a decision-making structure for a class as a whole frequently means 
that the class lacks the power to direct a lawyer’s actions. Ellman, supra note 55, at 1119. As 
2007] To Whom Does the Education Reform Lawsuit Belong? 145 
must make decisions about how to resolve disputes that arise among 
community members in order to represent the community effec-
tively.76 Within a class action, the issue of client autonomy is further 
complicated by the popular view that the lawyer’s responsibility runs 
to the class as a whole, including unnamed representatives.77 Regard-
ing the class as client enables the attorney to protect the interests of 
unnamed (and unidentiªed) class members unable to protect their 
own interests.78 Furthermore, considering the class as client while fos-
tering autonomy encourages attorneys to be mindful of the balance 
between the needs of current and future class members.79 This bal-
ance is especially important in the context of settlement negotiations, 
as class attorneys often pursue an institutional action to further cer-
tain public improvements rather than the interests of any particular 
client.80 Recognizing the tensions between the immediate interests of 
named plaintiffs and broader concerns animating lawyers’ or groups’ 
involvement in a structural reform lawsuit does not resolve these ten-
sions, but may lead to increased disclosure and improved communica-
tion between class action plaintiffs and their lawyers.81
 Many of these conºicts have not yet manifested themselves in liti-
gation concerning the enforceability of NCLB, and for this reason, 
                                                                                                                      
a result, the lawyer has a profound responsibility for gauging what is in the class’s best in-
terests. Id. 
76 See Rubenstein, supra note 32, at 1626. Rubenstein recommends that where there 
are disputes among community members, decision-making regarding goals of litigation 
should be more democratic, whereas more reliance on experts is appropriate for resolu-
tion of technical disputes about methods of litigation. Id. 
77 See Kane, supra note 3, at 394; Rhode, supra note 49, at 1204–05, 1214–15. 
78 See Rhode, supra note 49, at 1215 (indicating that these groups frequently will not 
know the likely consequences of litigation nor the extent of their stake in the outcome, 
and will therefore be unable to gauge whether or not they need their own representative 
to protect their interests); see also Kane, supra note 3, at 394 & n.56 (noting that because 
absent class members may be bound and their decisions might not accord with those of 
the self-appointed named representative, the class action lawyer’s role is more dominant 
than that of a lawyer in the traditional adversarial model). 
79 See Kane, supra note 3, at 396 (asserting that institutional litigation class attorneys of-
ten urge settlements favoring prospective relief and policy changes rather than relief for 
past harmful practices). 
80 See id.; Rhode, supra note 49, at 1186. 
81 See Bell, supra note 27, at 501–02 (discussing implications of Justice Harlan’s dissent 
in Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)). Bell 
observes that, particularly in school cases where an individual plaintiff might prefer a 
compromise that would frustrate attainment of the larger group’s goals, the choice be-
tween an immediate small gain and possible later achievement of a larger aim should be-
long to the named plaintiff, not to her attorneys. Id. (quoting Robert H. Birkby & Walter F. 
Murphy, Interest Group Conºict in the Judicial Arena: The First Amendment and Group Access to 
the Courts, 42 Tex. L. Rev. 1018, 1036–37 (1964)). 
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this article aims not to suggest how the lawyers in these particular 
cases could have acted differently, but to raise awareness of potential 
pitfalls to avoid in the future. The NLC lawsuit was ªled in February of 
2004, and the plaintiffs reached a court-approved settlement with the 
defendants in October of 2004, four days after the judge denied the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss and certiªed the plaintiff class.82 This 
left little time for intra-group conºict to develop prior to settlement. 
An assessment of the role of client autonomy in the NAACP’s inter-
vention in the Connecticut lawsuit would be premature, as the motion 
was ªled in January of 2006 and denied without prejudice in August 
of 2006.83 The court has recently invited a motion to intervene as to 
the remaining count of the complaint, and whether the NAACP will 
accept that invitation remains to be seen.84 The case is far from the 
remedy stage, where potential conºict among clients is likely to mate-
rialize.85 The strategies discussed in Part III may assist courts and law-
yers as this action develops, and in future complex education reform 
litigation. 
III. Addressing These Conºicts: Recommendations for Courts 
and Lawyers Engaged in Structural Reform Litigation 
[S]tructural reform litigation is an interest group strategy to change policy 
outcomes . . . . This kind of litigation reºects “an understanding by organ-
ized interests that a class action suit could call governmental attention to 
problems that were not being addressed . . . .” 
—Anthony M. Bertelli & Sven E. Feldmann86
 The decision to ªle a lawsuit as a class action, or to intervene on 
behalf of an existing class in a lawsuit, indicates that a particular issue 
has implications beyond the named plaintiffs, and the litigation is, to 
                                                                                                                      
82 Press Release, Nat’l Ctr. on Homelessness & Poverty, Homeless Students Triumph over 
State and Local Ofªcials (Oct. 2004), http://www.nlchp.org/Press/detail.cfm?PRID=35. 
83 Connecticut v. Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d 459, 466–67 (D. Conn. 2006). 
84 Id. at 68. 
85 See Rhode, supra note 49, at 1188–89 (noting that conºicts among clients in struc-
tural reform litigation frequently do not emerge until the settlement or remedial delibera-
tion phase because a loosely deªned consensus that rights have been infringed or needs 
ignored unites a group during the liability phase). 
86 Anthony M. Bertelli & Sven E. Feldmann, Ctr. for Econ. & Bus. Research, Dis-
cusssion Paper: Structural Reform Litigation Remedial Bargaining and Bureau-
cratic Drift 2 & n.2 (Feb. 2004), available at http://www.cebr.dk/upload/dp200403.pdf 
(quoting Kay Lehman Schlozman & John T. Tierney, Organized Interests and Ameri-
can Democracy 369 (1986)). 
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some extent, conceived of as a community-wide venture.87 Because a 
23(b)(2) class action ªnal judgment binds all class members,88 even 
when unnamed class members would have prioritized different reme-
dies—or preferred not to bring the lawsuit at all—it is essential that 
lawyers pursuing structural reform lawsuits, and the courts hearing 
these claims, consider the tensions outlined above in determining their 
respective courses of action.89 Although it may not be possible to re-
solve the numerous potential conºicts attendant to class actions that 
arise in public interest lawyering, awareness of the role of lawyers’ 
ideological commitments in determining the course of litigation, the 
implications of attenuated relationships between lawyers and their 
clients, and the role of client autonomy in class actions may lead to 
improved practices. The suggestions outlined below aim to mitigate the 
effects of these tensions.90
A. The Role of the Court 
 Guided by ethical responsibilities and the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, particularly Rule 23, the court plays an important role in 
class action litigation, but it is handicapped to some extent by the lim-
ited information it receives.91 Measures that increase and improve the 
amount and quality of information that a judge is able to consider 
would allow the judge to take account of the existence of conºicts be-
tween lawyers and clients or among clients, and take action to protect 
unrepresented or inadequately represented interests.92 Furthermore, 
given the volume of judicial resources consumed by class actions, closer 
                                                                                                                      
87 See Schlozman & Tierney, supra note 86, at 368 (stating that judicial decisions in 
class actions apply not just to the plaintiff but to a whole class of persons). 
88 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). 
89 See Bell, supra note 27, at 505–06; Bryant G. Garth, Conºict and Dissent in Class Ac-
tions: A Suggested Perspective, 77 Nw. U. L. Rev. 492, 502–03 (1982) (“Rule 23(b)(2) class 
members generally are unable to opt out of the lawsuit and may be bound even if they 
receive no notice of the action. [The Rule thus permits a class action] to proceed without 
the active support of class members.”). 
90 These solutions address the roles and responsibilities of courts and lawyers; operat-
ing separately or in concert, they may provide guidance for those seeking to improve struc-
tural reform litigation. See Kane, supra note 3, at 408 (discussing the importance of col-
laboration between lawyers and judges in this context). 
91 See, e.g., Model Code of Jud. Conduct Canon 3(B)(7) (amended 1991), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mcjc/canon_3.html (directing judges to “accord to every 
person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person’s lawyer, the right to be 
heard”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (outlining the procedure and requirements for bringing class 
action lawsuits); see also Rhode, supra note 49, at 1218 (emphasizing that courts often lack 
information regarding the need to invoke Rule 23’s procedural devices). 
92 See Kane, supra note 3, at 405. 
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judicial oversight from the beginning might avert retrospective formal 
reviews and proceedings that consume time and resources and that 
may occur too late to protect those most vulnerable.93
 In determining whether to allow a class action to proceed and 
whether to certify a particular class, courts apply the multiple re-
quirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.94 A central 
requirement of the Rule for the purposes of this analysis is courts’ re-
sponsibility to ensure adequate representation.95 In the more than 
ªfty years that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been in exis-
tence, several commentators have proposed that Rule 23 be revised to 
focus more on this issue.96 Others recommend that rather than mod-
ify the Rule itself, courts should scrutinize carefully whether all of its 
requirements have been met.97 Recognizing that conºicts among 
classes are not revealed and addressed until the settlement stage in 
                                                                                                                      
93 See id. at 406. 
94 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (denoting prerequisites for class actions); id. 23(b) (outlining 
additional requirements for maintenance of class actions); id. 23(c) (setting forth proc-
esses, procedures, and requirements for determining by order whether to certify a class 
action, appointing class counsel, establishing membership in a class, reaching judgments, 
and representing multiple classes and subclasses); id. 23(e) (indicating the procedures for 
settlement, voluntary dismissal, and compromise); id. 23(f) (establishing rules for ap-
peals); id. 23(g) (noting procedure for appointment of class counsel); id. 23(h) (stating 
procedure for obtaining an attorney fees award). 
95 Id. 23(a)(4); Rhode, supra note 49, at 1218. 
96 See Shapiro, supra note 54, at 958–59 (suggesting that Rule 23 “be revised to facilitate 
return to the fundamental point developed by the Supreme Court over half a century 
ago—that the constitutional propriety of class action treatment, and the binding effect of 
judgment on the members of the class, turns on the issue of adequate representation” 
(referring to Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940)). For Shapiro, adequacy of representa-
tion includes consideration of the potential existence of conºicts; he recommends that 
counsel remain responsible to the class as a whole by communicating regularly with a suf-
ªciently representative group of class members and ensuring that they be heard at critical 
stages of the process to guard against manipulation of the class by their counsel or their 
adversary. Id. at 959–60; see also Rubenstein, supra note 32, at 1660 n.174 (proposing that 
courts “reconceptualize the notion of adequacy of representation to ensure that the legal 
representatives utilize[] democratic decisionmaking processes in adopting their strategies 
and tactics”). 
97 See Kane, supra note 3, at 402–03 (recommending increased judicial scrutiny of class 
counsel’s competence and judicial approval of settlements under Rule 23(e), and suggest-
ing that the judge should participate actively in early stages of class actions, before settle-
ment talks begin, to increase her awareness of potential problems); Shapiro, supra note 54, 
at 960 (noting the court’s important role in overseeing class counsel); see also Bell, supra 
note 27, at 507 (asserting that principles of equity require courts to scrutinize closely 
whether representation provided by plaintiffs fairly and adequately protects class inter-
ests); id. at 507–08 (noting that courts must apply carefully the requirements of Rule 23 to 
determine the validity of class action allegations in order to protect the interests involved). 
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many cases,98 some scholars have proposed adjusting incentive struc-
tures to disclose and develop strategies to attend to class schisms ear-
lier in the litigation.99
 Currently, Rule 23 directs the court to determine “at an early prac-
ticable time” by order whether to certify a lawsuit as a class action.100 
Though the Rule does not specify a time limit, where the certiªcation 
decision is postponed, the rights of absent class members may not be 
adequately protected.101 To inform the certiªcation decision, the judge 
may conduct preliminary evidentiary hearings on the merits or the 
class issue, appoint special masters, request amicus briefs, or permit 
intervention in order to gather information.102 She may also grant or 
deny certiªcation conditionally.103 The rules direct a judge to either 
deny class status or attempt reconciliation of disparate interests where 
antagonisms among class members or between named representatives 
and the class have been discovered.104 In these cases, she has at her dis-
posal several procedural mechanisms, including sub-classing, interven-
tion, bifurcation, and exclusion, to accommodate conºicts among class 
members and to protect the interests of those who are absent.105
 Several commentators have suggested that existing procedural 
protections are not sufªcient for courts to meet their ethical and Rule 
23 obligations, particularly as to adequacy of representation.106 Incor-
porating additional protections into the rules may assist judges in 
gathering the information necessary to make informed decisions re-
                                                                                                                      
98 See, e.g., Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112, 1145–46 (11th Cir. 1985); Franks v. 
Kroger Co., 649 F.2d 1216, 1226 (6th Cir. 1981); Soskel v. Texaco, Inc., 94 F.R.D. 201, 203 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); see also Kane, supra note 3, at 397 (noting that, under Rule 23(e), the tra-
ditional resolutions of class conºicts that emerge later in the litigation include the with-
holding of judicial approval of settlement and the disqualiªcation of class attorneys from 
continuing to represent the entire class). 
99 See Rhode, supra note 49, at 1247–51 (proposing speciªc measures, such as requiring 
courts to create a factual record concerning notice and adequacy of representation, that 
would “require plaintiffs’ counsel or a court-appointed expert to submit statements detail-
ing contact with class members and any non-privileged indications of substantial dissen-
sion”). 
100 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A). 
101 See id.; see also Note, Conºicts in Class Actions and Protection of Absent Class Members, 91 
Yale L.J. 590, 596–97 (1982) (discussing the rights of absent class members to receive no-
tice of action, proposed settlement, or dismissal; request exclusion; participate in the liti-
gation; or object to adequacy of representation). 
102 See Rhode, supra note 49, at 1221, 1253, 1256; Note, supra note 101, at 598–99. 
103 See Note, supra note 101, at 598–99. 
104 Id. at 591; see Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 24, 39 (E.D. Cal. 
1977), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 649 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1980). 
105 See Harriss, 74 F.R.D. at 37–38; Note, supra note 101, at 591–92. 
106 See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 49, at 1191–94. 
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garding, for example, class certiªcation and whether to approve a set-
tlement.107 Furthermore, additional protections may assist courts in 
dealing with class conºicts once they have been disclosed.108 Professor 
Deborah Rhode describes a pluralistic approach, whereby distinct fac-
tions of a class would each have separate representatives, as one way to 
ensure that dissenting opinions are heard.109 Noting the problems of 
timing, manageability, and expense that this approach entails, she also 
explores a majoritarian alternative, which features polls and hearings 
as increased opportunities for class members’ direct expressions of 
their preferences.110 Rhode endorses the latter for a variety of rea-
sons: compared to the pluralist model, the majoritarian approach is 
less expensive, offers the court more direct access to class members’ 
views rather than their attorneys’ or named representatives’ interpre-
tive gloss, and may empower a larger number of individuals by in-
creasing their participation in the process.111 The disadvantage of the 
majoritarian model is that without considerable expenditure, the 
views elicited through procedures such as notice and hearings may be 
“unrepresentative, uninformed, and unresponsive to a range of con-
cerns particularly signiªcant in institutional reform litigation.”112 To 
counteract the tendency of such presentations to be biased, especially 
when there is a disjuncture between class preferences or when named 
plaintiffs do not appear to be sufªciently informed or disinterested to 
speak for an entire class, Rhode recommends that the court be inten-
                                                                                                                      
107 See, e.g., Garth, supra note 89, at 515–16 (discussing Abram Chayes, The Role of the 
Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (1976) and Owen M. Fiss, Foreword— 
The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1979)); see also Note, supra note 101, at 604–05 
(recommending relaxation of ethical rules restricting attorney solicitation to increase the 
amount of class information before the court at an earlier stage). 
108 See Rhode, supra note 49, at 1252. Rhode suggests that courts should refrain from 
denying intervention as untimely and from assuming that defendants have adequately 
presented the views of plaintiff class members who disagree with the position advanced by 
the plaintiffs’ lawyers. Id. She also proposes the use of advisory committees, recommends 
“clearer standards . . . for appointing and compensating separate counsel” and suggests 
increased use of “expert witnesses, special masters and magistrates for surrogate represen-
tation functions.” Id. at 1253, 1254, 1256. Rhode acknowledges that expense may prevent 
the use of these measures. Id. at 1256. 
109 See id. at 1221 (indicating that this approach could involve subclasses, mandatory or 
permissive intervention, or amici participation). 
110 See id. at 1221, 1224–25, 1228. 
111 See id. at 1232–33, 1243–44 (suggesting that majoritarian strategies may help the 
court to understand class members’ priorities and may increase the signiªcance accorded 
their opinions). 
112 Id. at 1233. 
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tional and conscientious in seeking out and bringing in a diverse 
cross-section of individuals to express their opinions.113
 In addition to developing new rules to guide the court’s own be-
havior, commentators have proposed mechanisms through which 
courts may regulate what happens outside of court to ensure partici-
pation in public interest litigation affecting groups.114 One scholar 
proposes that courts limit self-appointed community representatives’ 
potential for overreaching by instituting procedural rules that en-
hance community dialogue.115 Such measures constitute one method, 
short of requiring elections to make decisions about litigation, to 
counter the alienation and disempowerment caused by over-reliance 
on lawyers.116 Court rules could require that prior to ªling an action 
on behalf of a group, lawyers present evidence of group or commu-
nity participation in the ªling.117 To reduce the vulnerability of a 
group to manipulation by a lawyer, courts could allocate to specialists 
decisions that implicate group rights, such as initiation, pursuit, and 
settlement of litigation.118 Although this model may effectively cure 
some of the defects inherent in decentralized decision-making by 
group members or top-down decision-making by lawyers, it also in-
fringes on individual liberty and rests on the elitist assumption that 
specialists can better determine a community’s goals than can com-
munity members themselves.119
 Ensuring participation by community members through formal 
court rules or court-ordered procedural mechanisms for lawyers and 
                                                                                                                      
113 See Rhode, supra note 49, at 1236, 1244. 
114 See Garth, supra note 89, at 521 (“[C]ourts should encourage lawyers and others in-
terested in rights enforcement to seek out, inform, and mobilize those who stand to be 
affected by class actions.”). 
115 See Rubenstein, supra note 32, at 1659–60. 
116 Id. Rubenstein further elaborates on this proposal, suggesting that a court may be 
authorized by rule to dismiss an action in the event that an individual or expert plaintiff 
seeking to represent a group is unable to demonstrate that she can fairly represent the 
group’s interests and that the action ºows from a democratically produced group decision. 
Id. at 1670–71. Although this approach values individualism and expertise in addition to 
democratic process, it is imperfect because it is difªcult to ascertain who comprises the 
“community” being represented. Id. at 1672. 
117 Id. at 1659–60; see Garth, supra note 89, at 516 (suggesting that judges in the struc-
tural context should construct a broader representational framework); id. at 525 (courts 
should inquire into whether a class action brought by an organization is the result of a 
decision-making process responsive to its membership). 
118 Rubenstein, supra note 32, at 1662–63. The specialists, who need not be attorneys, 
must be skilled in determining community goals. Id. 
119 Id. at 1663–64. Rubenstein suggests that this model may be most appropriate for 
technical lawyering decisions. Id. at 1666. 
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class representatives would not necessarily provide the court with all 
of the information it needs to make informed decisions regarding 
adequate representation and other elements of class certiªcation. Be-
cause their obligations are not limited to named plaintiffs but run to 
the class as a whole, it is especially important that class counsel expose 
conºicts to the court.120 A policy of mandatory disclosure of potential 
conºicts between class and attorney, or among class members them-
selves, is one way for lawyers and courts in class actions to meet their 
ªduciary obligations to both named representatives and absent class 
members.121 Mandatory disclosure may impose ªnancial costs and 
unfamiliar roles and responsibilities on lawyers, and it may also im-
pede the settlements that named plaintiffs and their counsel desire as 
it invariably ºushes out dissension.122 However, mandatory disclosure 
would serve important due process values such as respect for individ-
ual dignity, autonomy, and self-expression.123 These values are espe-
cially important in institutional reform class actions, which involve 
“complex indeterminate remedies, fundamental personal values, 
nonapparent preferences, and politically vulnerable forms of inter-
vention.”124 Furthermore, in institutional reform cases, the defendant 
has often proven itself unable to control its own behavior, presenting 
increased opportunities for courts to guide plaintiffs’ active participa-
tion in the design of remedies.125 For this reason, courts must be ap-
prised of the full range of class members’ interests and preferences.126
B. The Role of the Lawyer 
 Although courts have ethical and legal responsibilities in structural 
reform class actions, it is lawyers who meet with clients, determine 
which claims to ªle, and make tactical decisions throughout the course 
of the litigation.127 Furthermore, the relief sought in structural reform 
cases, like those concerning the enforceability of NCLB, frequently ex-
                                                                                                                      
120 See Garth, supra note 89, at 521; Kane, supra note 3, at 405; Rhode, supra note 49, at 
1203. 
121 See Rhode, supra note 49, at 1204–05 (quoting Greenªeld v. Villager Indus., Inc., 
483 F.2d 824, 832 (3d Cir. 1973)). 
122 See Kane, supra note 3, at 406, 408; Rhode, supra note 49, at 1206–07. 
123 Rhode, supra note 49, at 1198. 
124 Id. 
125 See id. at 1199. 
126 Id. 
127 See Ellman, supra note 55, at 1120–21 (recognizing that the ability to wield a pro-
found inºuence on the characterization of their clients imbues lawyers with signiªcant 
responsibility). 
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tends years into the future, requiring that public interest lawyers de-
velop “long-term staying power to insure meaningful implementation” 
of their courtroom victories.128 Because ethical rules do not provide 
sufªcient guidance and procedural protections may fall short as well, 
class action lawyers must be especially attentive to their roles and the 
balance between their interests and those of their clients.129 Commen-
tators addressing this balance have focused on various aspects of, and 
have reached different conclusions about, the lawyer’s role. 
 One alternative emphasizes clients’ individual autonomy as a driv-
ing force in class actions.130 Professor Derrick Bell, for example, re-
minds lawyers that their job is to lawyer, not to attempt to lead their cli-
ents and the class in making decisions that should be determined by 
clients and shaped by communities.131 For lawyers involved in school 
reform, litigation as a strategy presents the seductive opportunity to 
focus on abstract legal principles rather than protection and advance-
ment of client interests.132 By remaining receptive to those interests, 
lawyers may increase clients’ involvement and nurture their autonomy. 
 Rather than focus on individual clients’ needs, Professor William 
Rubenstein emphasizes the role of professional public interest litiga-
tors’ expertise in class actions. In light of the American legal system’s 
emphasis on individuals, he asserts, it is important to value the exper-
tise of professional public interest litigators in litigation campaigns, 
even at the expense of attorney individualism or group decision-
making.133 This paradigm of client-centered lawyering in class actions 
requires broad conceptions of “client” and “competence.”134 Pro-
posed changes to the rules governing class actions would, for exam-
ple, require plaintiffs ªling an action on behalf of a group to provide 
pre-ªling notice to anyone whose interests are at stake, which would 
allow dissenting class members the opportunity to be heard.135 By 
placing the burden to come forward on community members without 
                                                                                                                      
128 Rabin, supra note 31, at 252. 
129 See, e.g., Ellman, supra note 55, at 1104. 
130 See Bell, supra note 27, at 512 (calling on lawyers involved in class action litigation to 
recognize their duties to the client and community); Ellman, supra note 55, at 1169 (cau-
tioning lawyers to refrain from overreaching). 
131 Bell, supra note 27, at 512; see Ellman, supra note 55, at 1169. 
132 Bell, supra note 27, at 504. Although Bell’s criticism, directed at the NAACP’s role 
in school desegregation litigation, may not describe the lawyers involved in the cases dis-
cussed in this article, it does sound an important cautionary note. See id. 
133 Rubenstein, supra note 32, at 1633. 
134 Id. at 1674–75. 
135 Id. at 1673. 
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granting them a veto power, this model both preserves the initiative of 
self-appointed representatives and experts and mandates that they 
enter into dialogue with other interested group members.136 Lawyers 
representing groups are expected to consider both their clients’ in-
terests and the consequences of their actions for others.137 In Ruben-
stein’s view, ethical, client-centered lawyering requires that a class ac-
tion attorney have experience that helps her to understand and be 
sensitive to the history, structure, and divisions of the community on 
whom her case will be binding.138
 Other commentators, however, might characterize Rubenstein’s 
emphasis on expertise and strict boundaries between the roles of law-
yer and client as “regnant lawyering” because it maintains the disasso-
ciated power over clients that dominates the traditional lawyer-client 
model.139 According to Professor Gerald López, lawyers should em-
brace a “rebellious lawyering” model, one which demands that lawyers 
and those with whom they work “nurture sensibilities and skills com-
patible with a collective ªght for social change.”140 Rebellious lawyers 
practice collaborative advocacy, connecting with the community they 
serve and working with their client community, not just on its be-
half.141 They must adopt a problem-solving orientation appropriate 
for working with others.142 This model involves brainstorming, design-
ing, and executing strategies that respond immediately to particular 
problems, while at the same time ªghting social and political subor-
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137 Id. at 1674 & n.226; see also Rhode, supra note 49, at 1214–15 (noting that class sen-
timent about appropriate remedies may evolve over the course of a protracted lawsuit, and 
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dination.143 This multi-layered approach is consistent with Professor 
Stephen Ellman’s observation that lawyers working on behalf of those 
who would otherwise lack adequate representation to achieve social 
reform must ªnd strategies that “target broad situations rather than 
individual circumstance[s].”144 These strategies are necessary because 
problems are often related to social conditions and because the needs 
faced by the poor will always exceed their lawyers’ capacity to meet 
them.145
 Like López, Professor Michael Diamond recognizes that the law 
on its own cannot provide the kind of long-term relief that poor and 
subordinated clients need.146 Accordingly, he proposes that lawyers 
should engage in a “cross-disciplinary and pro-active political assault 
on oppression” that involves interacting with clients on a non-
hierarchical basis, participating with them in planning and imple-
menting strategies designed to build client power, and viewing each 
client’s world beyond its legal implications.147 These “activist lawyers” 
assist their clients in developing and realizing enduring legal and non-
legal solutions for addressing problems that they face in the present 
and may face in the future.148 Diamond’s approach is consistent with 
Bell’s admonition that lawyers seeking social change “make clear that 
the major social and economic obstacles are not easily amenable to 
                                                                                                                      
143 López, supra note 140, at 38; see Ellman, supra note 55, at 1111 (asserting that pro-
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the legal process and that vigilance and continued activity by the dis-
advantaged are the crucial elements in social change.”149
Conclusion: The Role of Lawyers in Education Reform 
We believe minority children in Connecticut deserve a voice at the table in 
this litigation . . . . 
—John C. Brittain, chief counsel for the Lawyers’  
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law150
 Looking forward, lawyers are likely to continue to participate in 
securing and enforcing the educational rights of children and their 
parents, and their practice should be informed by the models of 
lawyering discussed above. What these various models have in com-
mon is increased attention to relationships between lawyers and their 
clients, and awareness of the power that lawyers have the potential to 
wield over their clients and their communities, particularly in the con-
text of complex litigation. To be effective, lawyers for groups must be 
involved with, and engaged in, the communities they represent. Edu-
cation reform presents numerous opportunities for attorneys to col-
laborate with clients and communities. A lawyer who respects her cli-
ents’ knowledge and autonomy will refrain from imposing her own 
ideological preferences on their decision-making processes. She will 
spend considerable time in the community meeting with students and 
their parents, listening to their concerns, explaining their existing 
rights, and exploring legal and non-legal approaches to the problems 
community members have identiªed. 
 In the event that her clients have expressed interest in NCLB as a 
tool to improve education, an attorney must assist them in investigat-
ing a wide range of options and address openly any tensions that 
arise, including implications of each option for future enforcement of 
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related educational rights.151 If, for example, she discovers either that 
some students and parents wish to pursue their rights under NCLB 
through informal advocacy within schools and school districts, while 
others want to ªle a lawsuit to accomplish the same goals, or that the 
students whose education is at stake disagree with their parents (who 
hold many of the students’ legal rights), the lawyer should help all 
group members to explore and evaluate multiple approaches and at-
tempt to seek consensus by presenting a strategy that incorporates 
various tactics. Furthermore, if it becomes apparent early in the dis-
cussions that the group cannot overcome its differences because, for 
example, some members believe poor and minority children are in-
jured by NCLB while others seek to enforce their rights under the 
Act, or because some class members seek enforcement of the transfer 
provisions of NCLB whereas others are more concerned about secur-
ing SES or school-based assistance for struggling students given a lack 
of viable transfer options within their district,152 their lawyer should 
explore the implications of these decisions with the group and rec-
ommend that dissenters seek alternate counsel. If disagreement 
emerges among group members or between the group and its counsel 
after the commencement of litigation, the lawyer should communi-
cate honestly with class members and, unless the class decides on an 
alternative course of action, disclose the disagreement to the court. 
 The skills required to be effective in this work may not be the 
same as those learned in law school.153 Training lawyers who are con-
cerned about their relationships with clients, aware of the potential 
tensions between their own ideologies and clients’ and communities’ 
autonomy, and effective in working for structural reform, requires a 
fundamental shift in legal education.154 It is difªcult work, but only 
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through careful attention to relationships with and among clients and 
communities will lawyers participate effectively in achieving meaning-
ful education reform. 
